According to the normative theory of prediction, prior probabilities (base rates) which summarize what we know before receiving any specific evidence, should remain relevant even aftor such evidence is obtained. In the present dtudy, subjects were asked to estiir.nte the probability that one of two states was true on the basis of (a) Information about the prior probabilities of the states and (b) individuating information, specific to the case at hand and known to be accurate with probability £. Subjects' responses were determined predominantly^by the specific evidence; the prior probabilities were neglected, causing the judgments to deviate markedly from the normative response. Theoretical and practical implications of this result are discussed. which has potentially serious consequences for decision making. As Kdhneman and Tversky state with regard to the Cab Problem: "Much as we would like to, we have no reason to believe that the typical juror does not evaluate evidence in this fashion" (Note 1, p. 13).
Method
The experiment employed numerous variations of the Cab Problem. The basic problem was modified to read as follows:
Two cab companies, the Blue and the Green, operate in a given city. Eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are Klue. and he remaining 15% are Green. A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. A witness identified the cab as a Green cab.
The court tested the witness' ability to distinguish a Blue cab from a Green cab at night by presenting to him film sequences, half of which depicted Blue cabs, and half depicting Green cabs.
He was able io make correct identification in 8 out of 10 tries.
He made one error on each color of cab.
Individuating Information 8 Content. Another problem was created, similar to the Cab Problem in structure but not content. The "Light»Blub Problem" takes the situation out of a court of law, employs a mechanical "witness," emphasizes random selection from the population, and presents the Invldtduatlng information as the base rate is given. I.e. , as a percentage. It read as follows:
A light bulb factory uses a scanning device which Is supposed to put a mark on each defective bulb It spots in the assembly line.
Eighty-five percent of the light bulbs on the line are OK; the remaining 15% are defective.
When a bulb Is good, the scanner correctly Identifies it as good 80% of the time. When a bulb is bad, the scanner correctly marks it 80% of the time.
Suppose someone selects one of the light bulbs from the line at random and gives it to the scanner. The scanner marks this bulb as defective.
What do you think is the probability (expressed as a percentage) that this bulb Is really OK?
One version of this problem presented the Individuating information in the same manner as the Cab Problem, saying that the scanner was able to correctly identify the condition of the bulb in eight out of ten trials, and it made one error on each kind of bulb. A second version of this problem had the phrase "at random" deleted.
As a further test of content effects, Kammerton's Disease Problem and Engine-Crack Problem were also studied here.
Base rate extremity. Several additional versions of the Light-Bulb
Problem were studied. The base rate of defective bulbs was made 1 in 100, The ' Right-Hander" Problem began as follows:
A kniilng incident was recently the subject of a jury trial in a particular city. A ,entral issue in the case was whether the assailant was right-handed or left-handed.
About 85% of the population of the city is right-handed;
the remaining 15% are left-handed.
A witness testified in court that the attacker had held the knife in his left hand
The remainder of the problem paralleled the structure for the other prvblems, with the witness being shown, by court test, to be 80% accurate in his ability to determine both left and right handed assailants under circaflistances similar to those in question. The subject was then asked to estimate the probability that the assailant was right handed.
Response format. Each of the variations described above asked the subject to answer in terms of a probability or a percentage. To provide Individuating Information
Subjects
The basic Cab Problem, its variations, and the two Hammerton problems were presented in group iettings to a total of 310 volunteers enrolled in psychology classes at the University of Oregon, and to 2A2 paid subjects at the Oregon Research Institute. Each subject saw on^y one problem, in written form.
Insert Table 3 about here As in the experiments by Kahneman and Tversky, the present subjects did use the base rate information when no Individuating evidence was provided (line 6).
Results
Since there was no discernable difference between the results from paid and volunteer subjects, data from both types of subjects were combined and are shown in Table 3 . The standard version of the Cab Problem (line 1) produced results similar to those obatlned by Kahneman and Tversky.
The median and modal estimate was 201 probability of Blue, thus confirming the tendency of subjects to neglect the base rate and rely predominantly on the witness. Placing the individuating information first (line 2) or asking subjects to estimate the probability that the cab was Green (line 3) had no significant effect on the dominance of the individuating information. The results shown on lines 4 and 5 Indicate that individuating evidence which confirmed the base rate was equally dominant.
When the confirming witness was said to be 60% accurate, subjects tended to estimate ehe probability or Blue at 60%, and when the confirming witness was termed 80% accurate, subjects median estimate was 80%. When subjects estimated the probability that the bulb was good, the problem with the extreme base rate (line 10) produced a somewhat higher median probability estimate than did the comparable problem with the less extreme base rate (line 8). However, the difference between medians was not statistically significant ftf a 2.12; df -1; p > .05). Furthermore, when subjects estimated the probability that the bulb was defective (line 11) they followed the individuating information very closely despite the extreme base rate.
The salience manipulation (line 12) failed to alter subjects' reliance on the individuating information. The responses to both of Hammerton's problems (lines 13 and 14) were dominated by the individuating information, leading .-ubjt'cts' estimates to exceed greatly the Bayesian answer of .48. In contrast to Hammerton's results, there was no significant tendency in the present data for the Disease Problem to elicit higher probability estimates than the Engine-Crack Problem.
The response to the multiple-choice versions of the Cab and Light-Bulb Problems are presented in Table h . Both problems produced similar results. The most frequent answer was a, which followed the individuating Information exactly and asserted that the base rate was irrelevant. Reponse b, which followed the base rate, was chosen least often in both problems.
Response c, which stated that both types ol information were important, was given by about 37% of the subjects tested on the two problems. This m • • Individuating Information 13 percentage can be contrasted with the 13% of the subjects whose estimates fell In the middle range (40%-60Z) on problems 1 and 8 in Table 3 , which were comparable except for the multiple-choice format. The difference in proportions is statistically significant (2 = 3.12; p < .001), and suggests that there may be a little more (but by no means adequate) appreciation of the importance of the base rate than is implied by the results of the direct estimation (non-multlple-cholce) format. Table 4 also indicates that subjects were, on the average, moderately confident, regardless of which answer they chose.
Insert Table 4 about here
I Discussion
The present study indicates that the dominance of Individuating information over prior probabilities is a robust phemoneraon, impervious to incidental features of the basic Inference task as well as to major changes In the content of the problem. Tht Irrelevance of content casts doubt upon Hammerton's hypothesis about, the Importance of the certain types of individuating information. All types were found here to be dominant.
A further weakness of Hammerton's explanation is its assumption that subje'ts' prior expectations about specific information are learned from experience.
Since the world operates according to Bayes' Theorem, experience should confirm the importance of base rates. In light of these difficulties, the representativeness hypothesis remains the most attractive general explanation of the present results.
The representativeness hypothesis predicts that probability estimates will be determined by the most salient feature of the evidence which,
In these problems, is the stated accuracy of the witness or testing device. . 1S71) showed that subjects' conservatism in t lese tasks esulted frJm improper operations which they performed on the sample data, rather than from overweighting of prior probabilities. Thus, the contrast between the "conservatism studies" and the present study mav be more apparent than real.
In both types of problems,subjects' lack of insight leads them to neglect prior probabilities and rely almost exclusively on specific evidence. 
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